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After theory
In French literary studies the reign of “Theory” has come to an end and its demise
has left a void. This article proposes that literary studies be founded on anthropolo-
gical considerations. In order to justify this approach the insufficiencies of theory are
first shown to be rooted in dualistic rationalism. Poetry concerns the whole expe-
rience of human beings, and three aspects of their irreplaceable individuality and
unity are explored: verbal image, rhythm and voice. Since poetry is essentially hu-
man it needs to be studied in an interdisciplinary context.
Ná teorie
In Franse literatuurstudie het die heerskappy van “Teorie” tot ’n einde gekom en het
daar gevolglik ’n vakuum ontstaan. In hierdie artikel word voorgestel dat literatuur-
studie op antropologiese prinsipes gebaseer moet word. Ter begronding van hierdie
benadering word eers die tekortkomings van teorie wat wortel in rasionalistiese
dualisme aangetoon. Digkuns betref die totaliteit van menswees en drie aspekte van
die onvervangbare indiwidualiteit en eenheid van elke mens word verken: verbale beeld,
ritme en stem. Aangesien digkuns essensiëel menslik is, moet dit interdissiplinêr be-
studeer word.
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It is common knowledge among literary scholars that in the periodafter the Second World War, the traditional humanities have gra-dually been replaced by the so-called human sciences in program-
mes and research. In order to confer scientific status on their disci-
plines, practitioners felt it necessary to found their activities on the
principles prevalent in the natural sciences, which obey the absolute
and universal law of determinism. During the sixties and seventies
this tendency gave birth in France to a kind of tyranny of what was
termed Théorie with a capital T. The phenomenon has exerted an ex-
traordinary fascination for literary studies in the Anglo-American aca-
demic world. In France, however, the theoretical era has come to an
end, mainly due to the deaths of its most prominent representatives.
The old guard is gone, and their disappearance has left a certain void
which good old philology, phenomenology and the new genetic criti-
cism have not been able to fill.1 We are witnessing a kind of disarray
which has been given the name of post-modernism. This is mere spe-
culation since no paradigm is held to be binding, and we know that
speculative consideration about any subject can give rise to endless
and often esoteric controversy.
However, the object of this speculation, the reality about which
literary scholars speculate, cannot itself be held to be mere specula-
tion: poetry is an essential human activity by means of which human
beings explore and manifest their own possibilities as living self-
conscious individuals, exploring what it is to be affected by their own
lives. I reserve the term poetry for all creative use of language, what-
ever form this creative enactment of the powers of the mind may
take, be it poem or novel, play or essay, and even any meaningful dia-
logue which opens up the possibility of a real encounter, an encoun-
ter through which an individual is enriched and at the same time
enriches the individual or the parts of the world or the environment
which are met. If the infant, the little human being who cannot yet
speak, were not a poet in his/her own way, s/he would not manage to
take his/her place in the community. These verbal forms are not a
fringe benefit of culture or a gratuitous pastime on the outskirts of
the deadly serious human activity of creating wealth — poetry is not
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1 The reign of theory has not gone uncriticised or without resistance, as may be
seen from the works of Descombes (1978 & 1983) and Compagnon (1999).
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merely an activity in which one indulges in one’s spare time if one
does not want to transform this time into money.
I want to formulate my conviction as simply but as strongly as
possible: man is a poetic being. If he ceases to be a poet, to be crea-
tive, then he ceases to be human. My contention of course has to be
justified. The precarious state of literary studies is there for all to see.
Unfortunately, the current predicament of literary studies has been
brought about by its theorising practitioners. Therefore, before em-
barking on my own defence of poetry, I want to understand what in
fact this “Theory” was, what it pretended to do and where it went
wrong.
1. Theory and the human sciences
It is generally acknowleged that the model for theory in the human
sciences was provided by structural linguistics: its conception of lan-
guage as a system of signs was applied to cultural phenomena (so
called because they do not occur in nature) such as myth, marriage,
the subconscious and the forces of production. These cultural theories
then had a boomerang effect on literary studies, which came to treat
poems as if they were a self-reflecting performance of the informa-
tional function of language; a symptom of some hiccup or other in
the subconscious; a product of the interplay between the forces of
production, a Molotov cocktail or damp squib in the struggle of the
classes — all applications or manifestations which could be explained
by these so-called structures. A structure, then, was defined as a de-
termining but invisible deep-lying system of relationships between a
limited and closed set of prime elements. The structuralist was
deemed able to discover the laws governing these relationships. In
fact the term structure designated what strictly speaking should have
been called a system. We will return to this notion of structure later.
The basic presumption of stucturalist human sciences is that all
human behaviour is secretly determined by underlying impersonal,
blind, senseless forces which serve as the real explanation of what is
happening in so-called cultural or human phenomena. When we do
something we do not really know what we are doing or why we are
doing it. We are merely drifting along on the surface of blind, opaque
matter governed by universal and therefore inescapable determi-
nisms. This view of human behaviour claims to be based on the epis-
temology of the classical natural sciences. Access to these determi-
nisms is gained neither through introspection (since there is nothing
inside) nor through intuition but via theory, conceived as a closed set
of concepts which accounts for whatever happens to occur in what we
erroneously insist on calling personally motivated behaviour.
It may immediately be questioned whether behaviour can be held
to be of the same fabric as atoms or molecules, but this was in fact
the not always openly admitted presumption of structuralism. It is
clear that if there is to be no escape from these determinisms, there
can be no place or space for any creative activity whatsoever. But is
the human being really a result of inescapable determinisms? It
seems to me that poetry is one of several human activities which
bears witness to the fact that human beings are able to disengage
themselves from their environment and their past as well as to rein-
vent solutions which in turn can create new situations in which they
can deploy their creative powers.2
Poetry in my sense of the word is the enactment of our creative
powers through language. In order to argue this contention I will
first submit structuralistic theory to a critique in the Kantian sense
of the term. Central to this critique, of course, will be the structu-
ralistic concept of language. I shall discuss this against the back-
ground of a revised notion of structure formulated in ontological
terms in order to unlock the creative powers of language and to show
that articulated language is the medium in which creative or primary
imagination operates and that it constantly has to reinvent the
structural links between human consiousness and the world. I shall
include in this discussion a reflection on the notion of living being.
My position regarding the pertinence of literary study is quite clear:
in order to make it more pertinent it is necessary to found it on
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2 A creative or primary imagination, which is the basis on which perception and
thought can take place, is active in the human mind. Thereby we are able to
solve problems, not only by inventing solutions but by changing the conditions
giving rise to the problems. Castoriadis’s entire oeuvre is devoted to this topic.
He developed his concept of primary imagination by reinterpreting crucial
passages in Aristotle’s Peri psyches (Castoriadis 1986: 327-63).
anthropological principles. The object of anthropology is to gain
some insight into the being that is called human. I will formulate my
own conception simply and provisionally as follows: a being is hu-
man only insofar as it is self-conscious and constantly able to reinvent
itself. Poetry is the most powerful way in which a human being can
perform that task. As human beings, we respond to our own ontolo-
gical necessity, which is not some kind of obligation or determinism
but a calling to realise the possibilities that we find in ourselves
(Marcel 1949). To do this, human beings apply creative and invent-
ive powers which manifest themselves through language — the three
most important aspects being rhythm, metaphor (verbal image) and
the voice.
2. Mind and matter
For the natural sciences, matter as such is clearly definable. But the
mind (or consciousness) which operates this definition cannot be in-
cluded in the matter so defined. What then is consciousness? Positi-
vist science has coined a term to designate and deal with what ac-
cording to its own principles cannot be: it is called an “epiphenome-
non”, a non-reality which can be observed concomitant to real phe-
nomena (Jonas 1987). Needless to say, this term is in itself a contra-
diction: either there is or there is not a phenomenon, and that which
appears together with it can neither be more or less phenomenal nor
a non-phenomenon. Epiphenomenalism is, in fact, theoretical sui-
cide. Indeed, scientific theory in the hard and natural sciences is ba-
sed on the principle of constancy and reversibility and therefore only
matter can exert power and have causal effectiveness; what is produ-
ced by matter must itself be material and have the same productive
powers, otherwise the principle of reversibility is transgressed. The
mind and consciousness are denied all real power since they are im-
material. But how can matter produce something that is not mate-
rial? We do not know. Nor do we know how an immaterial epiphe-
nomenon such as our mind could set in motion a material body
(Weizsäcker 1940). But if one holds to the epiphenomenal theory,
mind and consciousness are illusions of illusions, nothingness reflect-
ing nothingness. Such a theory of consciousness and mind is not very
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them): every living being is to some extent self-centred and self-
affecting; it senses that it is and its being is affected by itself. But this
awareness concerns the whole of a living organism in which all con-
stituting elements interact within an all-encompassing structure in
which they cohere and function. A living organism is first of all an
individual in a situation of exchange or interaction with what it is
not, with what surrounds it, with its environment. Through this in-
teraction, the organism interiorises external elements and raises them
to a higher degree of organisation, allowing initiative, self-control
and interactivity with surrounding organisms. An organism is itself
but this self is also linked to other selves, can link with what is out-
side itself in a relationship of mutual or reciprocal transformation.
This relation is what I would call a “structure” in the real and useful
sense of the word. To facilitate a fuller understanding of this notion
of structure some ontological remarks are necessary.3
3. Textualism
From the preceding remarks it is clear that structuralism remains
trapped in the rationalistically based dualism that opposes matter (res
extensa) to mind (res cogitans). The history of rationalism is a constant
battle between materialism and idealism. Materialism recognises as
real only things or entities which are positively verifiable: what re-
mains unverifiable is not permitted the status of being. Idealism, on
the other hand, will recognise as real only that which is posited by
the human mind: the real is that which human reason can account
for. I use the term “reason” here with reference to its Latin origin:
ratio meant “cause” as well as “account”. Rationalist dualism poses
the problem of the relationship between these two realms. This pro-
blem has always been formulated in terms of representation, a pro-
blematic notion which inevitably sites human consciousness in the
incapacity to reach the reality of things or beings and goes so far as
3 The subject is biologically founded in the individual living organism which is
self-regulatory and has relational autonomy based on cognitive or computational
powers. The fact that an individual organism defends itself by means of its im-
mune system is sufficient proof of its relative independence: it is not totally en-
slaved by the network of relations in which it is situated. Cf Morin 1999: 144-
54.
to cut the subject off from itself. Even the subject becomes an illusion
if, in order to give an objective account of itself, it may not base itself
on introspection or intuition. If one considers that consequent mate-
rialism very publicly claimed the death of God then it follows quite
logically that the subject can not stake too much of a claim to exis-
tence either — in France, in particular, the sixties and seventies wit-
nessed the so-called death of the subject and its caretakers have not
stopped gloating about it. It is easy to understand that deconstruction
is merely the final consequence of such thinking. If all that appears is
the product of unconscious forces then there is no meaning, no sense
to what happens. If one takes a text as such a happening, as the result
of the blind determinisms at work in reality, then it is only too easy,
and even permissible, to make it say whatever one likes, since all
meaning can only be illusion, mere immaterial image or fata morgana
in the desert of our non-fulfillable desires.
To deconstruct verbal phenomena and make them mean the op-
posite of what they seem at first sight to represent is a tempting en-
terprise. Whether out of a sense of taking part in some competition
or game, it becomes acceptable to try to show that Das Kapital is a
treatise written in justification of a capitalist social system, and Mein
Kampf a Zionist manifesto. In such a deconstructionist perspective
reality, especially lived and meaningful experience, ceases to be the
basis of real communion with fellow human beings as soon as lan-
guage is involved. One of the reasons why this is possible and prac-
ticable in texts resides in the decision to treat individual texts as
though they were entities whose only links would develop in the ad-
linguistic realm of all other texts,4 devoid of any relationship with
their origin or with any outside reality, as if a kind of arche-text had
initiated its own making, as if it were an integral part only of the ma-
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4 The adjective “ad-linguistic” qualifies a view of language held by philosophers
who have taken the linguistic turn by which all referential value of language is
negated. According to this position the human mind would endlessly wander
around from sign to sign without ever gaining access to reality. This view is
only possible within a dualistic framework wherein the mind is radically
separated from matter and has to operate with immaterial representations in
order to explain matter. As I endeavour to show, this model does not do justice
to the real situation of a living organism in the world (Hottois 1981).
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terial substratum on which it appears or of the situation in which it
surfaces. As all theorists know, this type of thinking is called textual-
ism. Foucault was its main proponent and it was developed to its ul-
timate conclusion by Derrida.
The principle on which textualism is based is, in fact, void. If one
says that there is nothing but the text then this sentence can only
mean that in order to know what the text is about one has to look in
the text and not outside or around it. But the text itself has referents
or a referent and the single meaningful question to be asked can only
concern the possibility of the text’s changing the nature of its refer-
ent(s). If it does, then there is no difference between fact and fiction,
between truth and untruth. This conclusion does not stand the test
of reality and it is not proven that all reality would be the result of
texts. In any case, since the text is considered to be a self-enclosed en-
tity, how could it have any effect on what is external to it?
Needless to say, this concept of the text as a closed entity is based
on the structuralist definition of language as a closed system of
signs.5 Such a conception is problematic since in reality only mental
systems can be held to be well defined, while language is certainly
not the result of a well-defining decision and its execution by the hu-
man mind. Paradoxically, in order to satisfy the criteria of natural
science, structuralism becomes a pure immaterialism that ignores its
own origin in rationalist dualism. The status of what is real becomes
problematic from the moment we fall into the dualistic trap set by
the rationalism of Déscartes. The main challenge is to avoid this trap
because whatever one can say, playfully or not, it is quite obvious that
Hitler’s Mein Kampf has had real consequences in history, conse-
quences almost too ghastly to contemplate, as has been the case with
the communist applications of Marxist theory. So there is a link be-
tween language and reality. And it must also be stated that if one de-
5 Structuralist linguistics is a deliberate deformation of what Saussure really had
in mind. As his lecture notes and manuscripts show, he was interested in un-
derstanding the organised way in which language changes through its usage in
a speech community but he was never able to develop a consistent theory about
language in transition (Fehr 2000). In any case, it is obvious that structuralist
human scientists have continuously misused his terminology, despite the fact
that this abuse has been denounced by linguists since 1970 (Mounin 1970).
clares the death of the subject then human beings are liberated or
stripped of their responsibility; nobody can be held accountable for
his own actions any more, and a despot is as valuable as a good Sama-
ritan. I acknowledge that this critique of textualism has been formu-
lated in a slightly provocative way. However, I am very strongly con-
vinced of the urgent need for a reaction against its demoralising ef-
fect, especially on the young who tend to give up all too readily in
their quest for meaning. But speaking more fundamentally, I want to
propose that we need to revise our notion of what is. In other words,
we have to rethink our ontology.
4. Structural ontology
Ontology is that branch of philosophy that tries to ascertain the
meaning of being. Whereas Oriental ontology is based mainly on the
notion of nothingness, the West has centred its ontology on the no-
tion of Being. Until the end of the Middle Ages in the Western
world all ontological speculation was substantialistic: “what is” was
conceived of as a substance, that which can stand on its own, sepa-
rately and as something in itself because it was created as such and
nothing except its creator could alter it. This ontology rendered
quite a number of phenomena inexplicable, such as change and
death. It also had problematic implications, the most disturbing  be-
ing that in order to maintain some kind of coherence for his crea-
tures, the creator was not free to intervene in what he himself had
created. This reasoning flew in the face of a conception of divinity as
a superiot or highest being endowed with the power of omnipotence.
At the end of the Middle Ages William of Ockham came to the con-
clusion that creation had to be contingent, opening the way for hu-
man endeavour to intervene in the world.
The intuition that beings are contingent thus led to a functional
ontology: beings were no longer seen as substance but as functions
one of another. In order to understand such a contingent universe it
became necessary to conceive of it as a system whose constituent parts
are held together by knowable laws of relation and interdependence.
Everything had to have its reason, but then science was condemned
to a search for these reasons or determinisms from which there could
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would become unknowable, or irrational. The ultimate achievement
of this search by the human mind for the reason behind what is
would then be a total coincidence of the mind that can identify its
own absolute knowledge and the known reality. According to Hegel
this would happen once the mind has recuperated itself through na-
tural history. This fortunate situation has not yet come to pass. For
our purpose, however, it is sufficient to see that structuralist thinking
is founded in this systemic version of functionalist ontology.
The structuralist definition of language as a system of signs allow-
ing communication is clearly an application of this systemic ontology.
As has been shown, this systemic definition of language has been ap-
plied to all so-called “cultural” phenomena observable wherever peo-
ple are to be found. People are thereby caught in a web of functions
tearing their unity as living organisms into separate elements roughly
classified into the two rationalistically defined realms of body and
mind. In reality, however, these two realms are not separable. Syste-
mic ontology condemns beings to total exteriority; living organisms,
however, have a certain interiority which is not totally separate from
the rest but organised around its own centre and able to contract re-
lationships with its environment — such relationships being not of
total dependence or determinism but of exchange. This insight puts
us in a position to develop a notion of structure which would not trap
us within dualistic antinomies.
As has already been suggested, there is one reality, at least for li-
ving human beings, which renders impossible any radical separation
between object and subject, or even any clear division between inside
and outside. That reality is our own body, our body proper as it is
called in phenomenology. We are incarnated beings engaging in a
mutually transforming exchange with what is not us. As an orga-
nism, our body is certainly matter but it is living matter, matter in
which a will to be formed, to form and to transform is at work
(Schelling 1988).6 This chiasmic relationship between my own inti-
6 In his controversy with Fichte over absolute consciousness and knowledge,
Schelling pointed out that in order to understand the formation (taking form)
of matter a formational will or capacity to be formed must be accepted. He
thereby exploded the German idealism in which rational dualism had attained
its apotheosis (Schelling 1988).
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macy and that which surrounds it constitutes a dynamic structure in
which the contracting elements are linked in a mutually transform-
ing exchange. This structure can be called co-creative since the ex-
changing elements constitute a whole that is more than the sum of
its components. Since it is dynamic and self-developing over time,
this structure is not only temporal but also historical: man has been
changed by his environment and in turn has changed the world. As
a consequence this structure has to be continuously re-invented.
Within Being there exist profound dimensions of different nature
which in their discovery are at the same time created. These dimen-
sions are of course not merely material. Through and beyond them
living matter is transfigured into spiritual matter. It would be useful
if we could restore the Latin adverb trans which combines the ideas
of pervading and transcending. Since the beginning of the nineteenth
century more and more of these dimensions have been discovered and
developed but in almost every case their originator tended to absolu-
tise them. An example is faith, with its counterpart despair, to which
it is irrevocably linked: this dimension was discovered and created by
Kierkegaard. Others include labour (Marx), the unconscious (Freud),
dialogue (Buber), hope (Marcel) and so on. The manner in which
these dimensions have been uncovered and explored — brought to
the surface, as it were, and actively practised — is quite important:
for instance, Kierkegaard developed the dimension of faith from a
position of despair. And so it was for all these dimensions which at-
tracted attention and came to be opened up by the awareness of their
absence or lack which established a need for them, their ontological
necessity. In that sense they are partly human creations — human
beings invented them (to invent deriving from invenire: to get to
something and find it) because they were already there to be found
and developed (Rombach 1971).
5. Beyond dualism
Situated at the centre of our being is primary or creative imagination:
man can invent new dimensions in and to what already is (Castoriadis
1986). Phenomenologically speaking, the creative power of imagina-
tion is based on the fact that we can and necessarily do have an image
of reality (in anticipation I may reveal that this image is the basis for
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what is called metaphor, which I prefer to call verbal image). The for-
mation of images is linked to the situation of our mind (or con-
sciousness) in a body, which means that we can never see the totality
of something; that our view is always situated at one point and at a
certain moment in time, but that we spontaneously create the glo-
bality of things and processes within the horizon in which they re-
veal themselves. Primary or creative imagination is active in both
time and space: it allows us to envisage the globality of things inside
space and of happenings in time; the latter are experienced as epi-
sodes, having beginning and ending within the continuous flow of
time. Experienced reality is not based on a chaotic heap of bits and
pieces that we subsequently shape into form: our perception is active
in that it shapes what is perceived in the act of perception itself
(Weizsäcker 1940). What appears to us does so as form in time, in
other words, as rhythm which I define provisionally as the coming
into shape or form of movement, or the form which flux takes.
It is important to note that the images we create are not represen-
tations in the rationalist sense of the word. In rationalism represen-
tations are concepts constructed according to the operating laws of
reason, concentrating on only certain aspects of things which can be
abstracted from them and placed in the timeless and spaceless realm
of reason. But these images remain bound to the temporal and spatial
horizons, in which they are found or invented; they are units of ex-
perience or of sensation, “percepts” and not concepts; they can and
must always be reinvented in concrete situations. Since they are units
they can be articulated and can become verbalised experience. Final-
ly, because our minds are indissolubly linked to our bodies, our rela-
tionship with the world will be unique. The irreplaceable and irre-
versible nature of that relationship with the world is manifest in our
voices. What is currently called prosody is in fact the set of means
that allows even a written utterance to reinvent the human voice
from which it originates. The world itself is thereby voiced. The
meaning which the world gains in its relation of exchange with the
human mind is made manifest. Therefore verbal images, rhythm and
the voice, which are the main characteristics of all creative usage of
language, are anthropologically founded. They are human features




First of all the verbal image, otherwise called metaphor. Our view of
what appears to us is always necessarily situated in our body; we can
never see the totality of things; we only have a percept of them, which
stands for their totality. Therefore it is not possible for human beings
not to have an image of things. From their infancy human beings are
able to draw such images, which do not constitute a replica of the
thing but manifest the relationship between mind and thing, the
latter being perceived from a personal perspective and in a certain
mood. In the image we do not see only the thing or feel only the mood
of the viewer but the relationship between them, which is a structure
in our sense of the word. Classical conceptions of an image and its
verbal counterpart, the metaphor, prevent us from understanding this
ontological structure and it is therefore necessary to revise them.
Since most theories of metaphor adopt Aristotle’s definition as
substitutive, I will show that this substitutive interpretation falls
short of all the implications his definition contains if it is replaced in
the context of his own thought. Aristotle states that metaphor con-
sists in the substitution of one word for another (Poetics 57b7). What
happens then is a transfer of meaning that gives rise to a figural or
non-literal use of a word. However, later in the same passage Aris-
totle observes that the Greek vocabulary does not have words for all
things and thereby destroys his own substitutive theory (if one were
to conceive of it as merely static). Metaphorising cannot be reduced
to a substitutive verbal process. In the text of his Poetics (59a7) Aris-
totle insists that finding a metaphor (transfering or reinventing a
word’s meaning) is a personal matter which cannot be taken away or
learned from somebody else. A good metaphor is based on a personal
view of resemblances between portions of reality, without in fact ex-
cluding the differences between them. The view which we have of
beings does not exhaust them; they always appear against a back-
ground or within a horizon that constitutes a realm in which they can
remain different because they can be viewed from an infinite number
of perspectives. I would call these views “percepts” in contradistinc-
tion to concepts, which try to fix things by eliminating their con-
crete perceptual and sensory qualities in favour of abstracted aspects
that extract them out of the world in which they are experienced and
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situate them in some logical category. Percepts, on the other hand,
grasp beings within the horizon in which the interplay between re-
semblance and difference continues to reveal their complexity in
relationship to personal sensation. The relationships held together in
a verbal image are focused in an individual whereas the common as-
pects forming the basis for a concept are located in the impersonal
realm of reason. Since it is based in sensation, a verbal image remains
a process that at all times can be reactivated and remains a tool for
reinventing the world. This is done in a playful manner, as Aristotle
says at the beginning of his Metaphysics where man is defined as a mi-
metic animal. “Mimesis” is not the mere duplication of what already
is, but a medial activity: the Greek verb is mimesthai, a verb indica-
ting that the action is turning back to the agent and thereby trans-
forming it.
The preceding remarks allow us to state that a good metaphor is
dynamic and can always be reinvented and recreated in concrete situ-
ations, from different perspectives within different horizons. It in-
cites a movement of the mind whereby new aspects are discovered or
rediscovered which enrich our perception and experience of the
world. It is the activity of what Aristotle calls primary imagination:
in his treatise On the soul (Book 3) the Stagirite posits this primary
imagination or “fantasia” without defining it or situating it precisely
in the inner space of the human soul. It is clear, however, that pri-
mary imagination is neither the producer and retriever of defective
images stored in memory, nor an agency active in the preparatory
process whereby the intellect conceives its abstract concepts or ideas.
The main aspect of metaphor to be retained here is its dynamic na-
ture: metaphors become tropoi — a noun derived from the verb stre-
fein, which means “to turn or twist around towards something” or, in
this case, to turn or twist the mind towards reality (Jenny 1990: 35-
41). A metaphor, a good one that is, forces us to go back and look at
reality as it really is. Its understanding is not based on the verbal
meaning of the words but on a new and investigative look at things
in the world. The process just described is in fact the same as that
which we call perception. Since our mind is located inside a body and
always operates from a point of view it is constantly necessary to look
from several points of view in order to make sure we are right in our
perception. Thus perceiving becomes a kind of story since it evolves
in time. We can err in our perceptions but by turning back to what
we have perceived we can correct this error — without, of course,
ever being able to achieve in one glance a total view of what is. Me-
taphors are structured in the same way as the ontological structure in
which we exist in the world: they manifest the structure of our being
in the world and the being of the world in us.
7. To grasp
The chiasmic relationship between body and world can be illustrated
by a survey of some fundamental semantic fields in the Indo-European
lexicon. It might be objected that there are other types of languages
such as Ouro-Altaic, Indo-Chinesian, Hamito-Semitic, Bantu and
Malaio-Polynesian (Lohmann 1964) but it is in our Indo-European
realm that the subject-object opposition has found its most conse-
quent linguistic development in its lexicon and syntax. The deep
structure of modern Indo-European languages corresponds to the
dualistic rationalism in which we currently find ourselves trapped.
Nevertheless, if one researches the reconstructed history of these
languages one will find that nearly every root is at the beginning of
a double configuration of words and expressions, one concerning
what we can call material phenomena in the world and the other ex-
pressing interior movements of feelings and thoughts.
Generally speaking, the Indo-European etymon is a metaphor
manifesting this structure, in which a consciousness’s awareness of
the world and of its processes is transported into the world which in
turn makes an impression upon the awareness, seizing and shaping
it. To grasp is not only to handle or a movement of the hand, but also
a mental process whereby our mind takes hold of its content in order
to possess and manipulate it (the latter word incidentally contains
the Latin manus, hand). There is a direct link between the mental and
the bodily grasping, taking hold of, reality.
In the context of the preceding remarks it is useful to note that
neurology has established that the nerve centres controlling the
movement of the hand are more extensively developed than those
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this superior status since human beings adopted the upright stance,
liberating their arms and hands from locomotion. Standing up also
provided human beings with a horizon and with the necessary dis-
tance from their immediate environment. In other words, they could
start to grasp their environment not only with their hands but by the
attention they could muster mentally. The two movements remain
fundamentally analogous: our material grasp is rarely total, and takes
objects or processes by their parts, as does our mental grasp, sorting
out resemblances and differences. Moreover, our hand is the first
means of directing our attention and that of our counterparts towards
parts of the world we intend to thematise within the horizon in
which they appear to us. Thus we are able to express our desire and
grasp what is at a distance. To grasp, then, is to seize and to point to
reality, both bodily and mentally.
From a more recent discipline concerned with the observation of
human behaviour, ethology,7 comes a confirmation of the importance
of this pointing with the finger in the process by which an infant
learns to speak.
From the point of view of etymology, it must also be noted that
Indo-European contains another root at the source of terms designa-
ting the hand, namely “mear”, which is the origin of the Latin word
manus. This root gives rise to words and expressions concerning the
exercise of power or command. If grasping corresponds to the closing
of the hand in order to seize, the open hand corresponds to showing
and giving. The hand grasps and gives, hides and manifests, func-
tioning at the intersection between inside and outside, mediating
between our soul and the world. But what is even more meaningful
is that the root “mear” also produces the term “mouth”, thus esta-
blishing a clear link between the expressive function of the hand and
that of the human face, as well as the human capacity to articulate
feelings and thoughts.
7 We refer here to the work of Cyrulnick (1995), who establishes without doubt
the need to take into account the whole of a living being, be it animal or hu-
man, as it reacts and adapts to its condition in the world and society. But only
human beings can create symbolic links with the outside world. Speech is based




Concrete illustrations of this relation can be found, for instance,
in the “tree-alphabet” that Robert Graves (1962) studies in his White
Goddess: this alphabet, based on the characteristics of a number of
trees, is also transcribed into a finger alphabet with each articulation
of the five fingers representing a letter. A most illuminating illustra-
tion of the point I want to make can be found in the famous hands
painted on the walls of the cave of Gargas, apparently representing
fingers in different stages of amputation (Leroi-Gourhan 1983: 222-
41). But a more attentive study has shown that in fact the absence of
articulations corresponds to the bending of the fingers and that as
such they represent signs which hunters used to communicate with
their fellows in a silent manner so as not to disturb their prey. In
poetry, too, we find the verbal image of the hand playing a central
role. Thus the modern French poet Pierre Reverdy uses the hand as a
symbol for the illuminating role of light: it renders visible the ex-
pansion and progression of light as it radiates from a centre (Attal
1969: 101-32). In doing so the hand manifests a mysterious force,
the presence of a spiritual nature.
To understand this metaphor we have to take a good look at our
hand: the clenched fist can be opened so that the fingers radiate from
the centre of the palm as light radiates from a centre. So when Homer
speaks of the rosy-fingered dawn he refers to the expansion of light
from a centre. Incidentally, this is exactly the example Aristotle (Poe-
tics 57b25) gives of a catachresis (a “figurative” term for a reality for
which the Greek language had no literal word). Lausberg (1960:
288-91) observes that there is no verb to designate the expansion of
light and that the term designating the sowing of grain must be
used. Sowing was, of course, done with the hand, which first grasped
the grains in the fist and then threw them out by opening the fingers
in a centrifugal movement. In reflecting on the image of the hand we
are not dealing with figures of speech or combinations of semes; we
are in the process of grasping what the hand is for us as human be-
ings — an organ which permits and shapes some aspects of our
structural relationship with the world.
What I have done here is not to elaborate a theory of metaphor
but to reflect on the ontological structure (in our sense of the word)
of the hand, phenomenologically speaking — exploring its eidetic
image. To conclude this reflection I refer again to Aristotle: in his
treatise On the soul he draws an analogy between the hand and the
soul, saying that just as the hand is the tool of tools, the soul is the
form of forms. This comparison is not arbitrary but based on a struc-
tural analogy between the hand and the soul.
8. Rhythm
In discussing the verbal image I dealt with the spatial relation be-
tween the body and the world. The notion of rhythm concerns our
being in time. Most people will associate with the word “rhythm” a
regularity sufficiently obstinate and clear to be noticed, or the form
of a movement, as in sport where one hears commentators say that a
tennis player or a fast bowler has not yet found his rhythm. This use
of the word is in fact apposite to our purpose: it is based on the
insight that the player (or his body?) knows how to perform a certain
movement but does not succeed in enacting it properly and effec-
tively. The same principle applies in poetry. Understanding a poem
depends on a correct feeling for its rhythm, not in the sense that cer-
tain regularities determine its shape or form, but in the sense that its
meaning as a whole is distributed in time; that this meaning takes
its time, and that this time is formed, or made of a certain configu-
ration: this configuration is what I call rhythm. The prosody of the
poem is certainly part of this configuration, but only part: its func-
tion is not only to establish regularity or harmony but to force the
reader to abandon any merely intellectual attitude to its confi gura-
tion. Prosody appeals to his sensibility; indeed, a rhythm is felt or
must have been felt before it can be analysed or broken up into mea-
surable parts. It is possible to argue the correctness of this intuition
on the basis of an investigation of the history of the notion of rhythm.
9. History of rhythm
The notion of rhythm has been the topic of heated debate in French
literary studies for some time now. Seminal to this debate has been
an article by the linguist Benveniste (1966) on the notion of rhythm
in its linguistic expression. Benveniste sets out to go beyond the Pla-
tonic definition of rhythm as the form which a movement takes, un-
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leashing an almost uncontrollable extension of its scope, by adducing
the etymology of the word. Rhythmos is linked to the verb rhein, mean-
ing the rhythmic or regular flow of water. But a survey of its usage
in all sorts of texts reveals a wide range of connotations.
From the start “rhythm” is the type of term which designates a
complex reality, or rather points to the complexity of various pheno-
mena, from the waves of the sea to a particular form of handwriting.
The first occurrence seems to be a fragment of Archilochos (712-648
BCE) — the first subjective poet according to Nietzsche — who is
quoted as having said (Diels fr 67a):
Do never exult openly in victory nor abandon yourselves to lamen-
tations in defeat; but take pleasure where it can be found, do not
worry excessively about misfortune and grasp [understand] that
rhythm maintains humanity.8
In Greek the verb echein (which I translate by “to maintain”) is po-
lysemic, its meaning ranging from “to hold and to have (power, pos-
sibility, capacity to do, etc)” to “behold, contain, include, etc”, there-
fore the process designated by it is complex and partly determined by
its context. Despite its broad scope the meaning of the term rhythmos
never left the human realm; it was never used to indicate cosmic re-
gularities in themselves (here the term harmonia was used, or kosmos).
Even if its meaning varies from more or less fixed form (schema as dia-
gram, echein as “to have or maintain in one’s possession”) to flux (rhein
as “to flow”) it always concerns features of living human beings, the
human order in its relationship with the cosmic order conceived as
an all-inclusive unity or totality. We must not forget that to the
Greeks the cosmic order was eternal whereas sublunar developments
were marked by change and decay. So what we call living organisms
experienced this cosmic order in a particular way, in its continuous
transformation on the level of experience. Rhythm would then be
order as lived by human beings. Therefore the notion of “rhythm”
could refer to the continuous way in which man exists within that
cosmic order although being exiled from it by his own mortality. As
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8 Ne jamais exulter ouvertement dans la victoire, ne jamais s’abandonner chez soi
aux lamentations de la défaite; mais prendre plaisir où il se trouve, ne pas s’en
faire avec excès pour le malheur et saisir le rythme qui maintient l’humanité
dans ses attaches (Sauvane 1999: 8).
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developing form, rhythm reflects this situation of inclusion and
exclusion inside a changing order.
The implications of this allow me to consider rhythm to be not a
static form resulting from some formational power but a form which
itself has this power. The image of a stream can exemplify this idea
of a forming form: as the stream progresses in its own swirling move-
ment of flux and reflux, it transforms the land through which it
flows, tracing and leaving traces of its passage in the continuous pro-
cess of erosion and sedimentation. Rhythm is neither an empty form
nor a mathematically calculable or representable isometric of propor-
tions or durations, but the way in which living matter takes shape
and place, is reshaped by the world and in turn reshapes that world.
In this sense man is a rhythmic being, capable of being conscious of
this continuous process of assumption of difference inside identity.
Needless to say, rhythm is felt in the flesh and the blood; feeling a
rhythm is tantamount to feeling how I am my body, and thus it is
not a purely mental or intellectual feature of my being. A poem in
its general sense is thus a verbal enactment of man being and having
his body proper, because he himself is his own body participating in
the cosmic order. This enactment is performed by the voice (an idea
to which we shall return).
How then does this rhythm manifest itself in a particular language?
Every natural language has a deep structure (not the one Chomsky in-
vented) that is shaped not only by its syntax and lexicon but also by its
music (its specific rhythm in the sense of accentuation and the dyna-
mics of its sentences or utterances). I am not going to venture to dis-
cuss many languages. French will have to suffice as an example for the
moment, but I am convinced that all languages have their own rhythm.
10. Rhythm in French
French is an oxytonic language: the dynamism of its sentence struc-
ture accelerates towards the end of sentences and in rhythmic word
groups or syntagms the accent always falls on the last pronounced
syllable. In contemporary French, linguists have identified what they
call a tendency to the “major cadence”: the heavier word clusters are
generally placed at the end of the sentence. This pulsional order con-
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tradicts the so-called natural or progressive order that is based on the
logical structure of an affirmation, an order that is supposed to endow
the French language with clarity and even universality. In the natural
order (called natural because man is an animal by nature equipped
with reason) the grammatical subject always precedes the predicate
that governs the various complements. The segmented sentence, on
the other hand, jumps, as it were, right to the emotionally or rhema-
tically most important word and represents this word in the follow-
ing progressive phrase by the relevant pronoun.
One example will suffice. I take it, at random, from the study on
rhythm that I considered when discussing the history of that notion:
“Le ‘rythme’ qui semble effectivement régler la vie des humains, Ar-
chiloque peut dès lors le voir à l’oeuvre en toute circonstance” (Sau-
vane 1999: 13). I translate literally: “The ‘rhythm’ which seems ef-
fectively to regulate the life of human beings, Archilochos can there-
fore see it at work in all circumstances”. The first segment in fact ex-
presses not the subject but the object of the sentence of which Ar-
chilochos is the grammatical subject. Rhythm as defined in the open-
ing segment is represented in the syntactically complete sentence by
the pronoun “le”. By so doing, the author bisects his sentence, inter-
rupts the natural order and thereby confers on subject and object
equal rhythmical and mental importance. The apparent incompatibi-
lity between natural or progressive order and pulsional dynamism in
real spoken French is solved in this type of bilateral sentence which
I call the segmented sentence.
The segmented sentence forms part of the deep structure of the
French language since it can be found as early as the first French
poem, namely the Song of Roland (the earliest text we have at our dis-
posal, probably composed in the last quarter of the eleventh centu-
ry). But more to our purpose: we may note that this segmented struc-
ture corresponds exactly to the structure of French verse. In general
it is true that the prosody of poetry cannot contradict the profound
structure of a language. In French, the main types of verse are the
decasyllable and the dodecasyllable or alexandrine. Their structure is
segmented in the sense that they are composed of two more or less
equal halves held together by a central caesura, making the whole
able to manifest a basic and profound pulsion situated in the body
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and not expressive of any idea or concept. This structure is also used
in everyday language and in prose: it can be found at all times in the
most controlled and literary prose. But more generally speaking, a
sentence is not only a notional or logical unit but a rhythmical one:
its components do not cohere only on a logical or syntactical or infor-
mational level. When we begin an utterance we project a trajectory
so that the interlocutor is immediately aware of that intention and
senses when a sentence will end: without this projection we would
only witness a series of sounds or words without coherence or sense.
What holds these elements together is of a rhythmical nature. The
German term for sentence may be useful here. Satz means sentence
and at the same time leap: a sentence is a leap into the future, and
the whole is a way or shape in which time is held together and ac-
quires sense. We must not forget that the latter word etymological-
ly combines the notions of meaning and of direction. Prosody, then,
is the way in which time is organised according to sense (meaning
and direction) and thereby acquires density; ceasing to be a string of
atomic moments, it is time lived and experienced in a body, time
which is going somewhere. Each sentence in its context is an event
and constitutes an interruption in the flow of time. It can therefore
be the beginning of something new; it opens up new possibilities,
not only in real life but also in the language it uses to manifest sense
or meaning. An integral component of this event, of this surging for-
ward of meaning is, of course, the voice that utters the sentence. As
is the case with verbal images and rhythm, our voice is inseparably
linked to our living body.
11. Speech
Wherever in history we find evidence of writing it is clear that pho-
nation or speech has preceded it. This observation is also valid as far
as the development of infants is concerned. Humans are beings who
have a voice. The question of what a voice is, however, concerns a
most complex reality. Indeed, a voice is not an object, it is not a bo-
dily organ but the result of what humans can do with certain organs
whose function was and is not primarily that of producing articulated
sequences of sound (Goertler 1972). I use the past tense on purpose
here because our vocal apparatus has been found to be the result of an
extraordinary recycling process in the evolution of living organisms.
It must immediately be added that this insight into the genesis of
the human voice has important implications, the most important be-
ing that our vocal apparatus does not correspond to a limited func-
tion in the body but in fact offers the possibility for the whole of the
living body to manifest itself to the external world in an articulated
manner. Speech is the enactment of what we are as persons, as indi-
vidual incarnated beings. In discussing the ontological status of hu-
mankind, I stated that human beings, insofar as they come to exis-
tence, have to respond to what I called an ontological necessity: to
the appeal of being. One will only do this by enacting that response:
one has to act out what one is and show where one is on the path of
one’s own becoming. The continuity of our individual being is ma-
nifested in our voice. Having a voice distinguishes human beings
from other living creatures and having my voice, being a person (in
the sense of personare, which of course is a kind of etymological pun
but says what it means) distinguishes me from my fellow human be-
ings. There are thus two stages in my discussion of the voice: first to
establish the uniqueness of the human voice and then to show the
role which articulated utterances (or speech) play in the manifesta-
tion and consolidation of a person.
12. Voice
As has been stated, the voice is not an organ in itself: we can certain-
ly measure its tone, pitch, strength and so on but never its expres-
sivity or its presence. Our voice is our most individual characteristic.
Many organs are involved in producing articulated sounds, some of
them being the result of successful evolutionary recycling and one of
the most important an original creation. This latter is the most inte-
rior of them all. During the third month of its life in the uterus, the
human foetus develops a blastema in the larynx, a feature that no
other living creature possesses. It is to this blastema that the vocal
chords will be attached. It allows for an exceptionally wide range of
tensions in the vocal chords and thereby transforms our larynx into a
highly complex instrument capable of a great variety of vocal sounds.
Moreover, the glottis in the human larynx is situated at a lower level
than in primates, allowing for more subtle control of the movement
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of air through the vocal apparatus (Reichholf 1991: 214-5). This is
how a human voice can be so expressive and moving, even before it
is used in articulate speech. The pharynx, the space in the throat be-
tween the larynx and the nasal cavity, where, with the palate as a
sound base, phonation in effect takes place, is unique to humanity.
But the larynx itself — and this is the ingenuity of recycling — is in
fact a development of the gills which a living organism needs and
needed while in water. These gills were linked to the bowels, which
are controlled by the vegetative nervous system that is at the same
time responsible for the emotional side of our life, hence the link be-
tween our vocal instrument and emotion. Our voice manifests our
emotions as they are embedded in the depth of our body, and on the
basis of this expressive power verbal expression, articulate manifesta-
tion develops. The larynx is, so to speak, our inner face. The human
face is situated on top of a kind of storied building rising from the
throat, where the larynx is situated, to the pharynx at the back of the
mouth, and to the face. The face is also special because, situated on
top of our body, it allows binocular vision. All these features of our
body make our voice something special: it really stands for the whole
of what is going on in our body lived as a totality, the result being
the possibility for human beings to manifest their presence, in onto-
logical terms, to respond to the call of being. How is this voice
linked to the continuity of our being? In order to understand this
link we have to leave the domain of evolutionary anatomy and pro-
vide a phenomenological description of what happens when we hear
and speak.
13. Voice and absolute subjectivity
The articulated sounds we produce result from the way in which our
vocal organs pressurize and relax the flow of air through the upper
part of our body. Articulated sounds result from the action of these
organs on a void in a movement of contraction and expansion; in
other words, articulation takes place in a rhythm of systole and dia-
stole (as heart and our lungs), a binary rhythm of opening up to the
world and returning to the interior space of our body where our ex-
perience of the world, sensation and emotion, are located. But more
important is the fact that these two movements are not merely suc-
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cessive in time but mutually anticipatory, each from inside itself
opening up to the following contrary one. The process links two reci-
procally inducing movements. This rhythm of combined and mu-
tually inclusive flux and reflux, of import and export rather than
change or simple return to a base is the bodily execution of all lived
verbal enactment (Maldiney 1987). At the same time this structure
(an inductive relationship between mutually transforming elements)
is evident in all verse form, from versura to parallelismus membrorum.
The term versura designates the particular bilateral structure of the
segmented sentence and its prosodic counterpart, one segment open-
ing up towards the next, and the latter returning to its rhythmic
predecessor. Meaning and sound induce one another, bring one
another out. But the reverting movement retains that which has been
reverted, incorporating it not in a dialectical synthesis but in a living
and creative cell.
With regard to structuralist linguistics it is important to stress
that such a rhythm does not result from a choice between alternatives
and therefore does not fall under the competence of linguistic analy-
sis or theorization of ex post facto metrical “constraints”. Rhythm does
not remain trapped in the web of binary differences out of which the
system of language is supposed by structuralist linguistics to be
composed. Moreover, it is quite clear that language is not pitted
against voice, or the other way round: our voice is human not because
it is so articulated but because of the typical movement of aperture
and closure, of diastole and systole. Our voice is the manifestation of
our living body which is inseparable from what we call our mind —
both are one in our soul. This term is used here in its non-religious
sense: our soul is in us the power to witness what is going on in and
around us. Recalling the Latin adverb trans, we can say that our soul
is the dimension in us trans which we are in the world and trans
which the world is in us. As a consequence the tonality of the world
resounds in the human body, which in turn exteriorises that “echo”
in a movement of mimesis or recreation through the voice, which may
be said to be a phonetic articulation of reality. Through the human
voice the world itself acquires its voice. The process of mimesis, as has
been pointed out, is not one of mere imitation, duplication or simu-
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lation, but a transforming process of both sensed reality and our own
interior world.9
The full potential of this recreational or, more accurately, “co-
creational” process resides in the fact that our hearing is not merely
passive, but both active and passive. I do not produce the sounds
which reach me from the external world, and I cannot close myself to
them either — there is no membrane or organ, such as the eyelid,
which would allow me to close my ears. On the other hand, in order
to hear I have to follow actively and keep the various sounds together
which thereby acquire sense and direction, but at the same time I am
able to reproduce them voluntarily on the basis of the impression
they make on me. These bodily processes of hearing and speaking,
listening to an appeal and responding can be so complex because they
are part of, or are situated within the realm of absolute subjectivity
which is my body. This subjectivity can be called absolute insofar as
it is mine only, it is my body-proper, and I can not have sensations
by means of any other body than my own. This body transforms what
would otherwise be total dispersion into order (Henry 1975), thereby
expanding my bodily capacity for experience and sense. At the same
time, literally, to speak and to sing, but also to listen and be attent-
ive, imply taking the initiative for organising time. Thereby my
voice confirms me in my own duration through its spiritualisation:
my voice is not an object but manifests my soul. Otherwise stated:
sounds produced by me are immaterial but marked by me; although
they do not adhere to my body they nevertheless manifest my pre-
sence. Furthermore, while I speak I hear myself from both in- and
outside. My voice comes out of me but at the same time remains
inside me. Therefore my voice is the basis for memory: during its
own operation it requires me to go beyond separated moments in
order to produce a coherent sequence which is the sentence. Active
integration and attention are required: what is produced, even if one
wants to consider it purely from a materialist point of view, is irre-
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9 The anthropologist Jousse developed this notion of mimesis as long ago as the
1920s and 1930s but he has been largely ignored until recently, partly because
he published hardly anything: for him orality was the essence of human lan-
guage. Some of his work has now been translated into English and the archives
containing his lecture notes are in the process of publication (Jousse 1997).
versible. Hearing unites the inside and the outside (inside my body I
receive sounds coming from outside which I have to keep together in
my attention), thus this process occurs in duration, keeps time and is
the basis for reminiscence (Rossi 1962). It is also linked to bodily or-
gans, therefore I remember, I can go back to it in the members of my
body where my experience has been integrated in my brain and ner-
vous system. My body is not an instrument allowing me to sense and
perceive; it is what I sense and perceive, feel and experience. There-
fore my or your subjectivity is absolute: nobody can deputise for you
or me. I have to be myself. And nobody can die in my place, there
where I am myself. This fact, however, does not prevent me from wil-
fully and skilfully contracting relationships with what I am not. But
this alterity is in me and I am in it. ... But what has all this to do
with a poem?
14 Conclusion
I will conclude with an anecdote (Svembro 1974). When Pindar
went to consult the oracle in Delphi the priests asked where his sacri-
ficial goat was, since he had not brought one along. Pindar answered
by saying that he had brought them a “paean”, a poem. This was not
mere arrogance: Pindar could say so because a poem is an articulated
being, as an animal or a human being is. It could be objected that we
read poems nowadays in their printed form and that writing, the fact
that they are written and printed, changes everything: the printed
word can never manifest absolute subjectivity. However, the fact of
the matter is that reading a poem is necessarily performed in absolute
subjectivity. Unless the business of poetry is restricted to an interface
between two computers, subjectivity will always be involved. From
its written or printed form we can enact a poem, we can decide to do
so, and those who decide not to do so cannot tyrannically decide that
I do not have the right or the capacity to do so. A poem is not a coded
object but an experience incarnated in language which can be re-
enacted in the recreative act of reading. This experience is not sub-
jective but intersubjective. The sense of a poem is not in it, or in me,
nor is it a futile extension of matter: sense originates in a complex re-
lation between mind and world through a body with which absolute
subjectivity is linked. In its response to alterity this subjectivity can
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enter into dialogue with other subjectivities so that sense arises out
of this dynamic structure. This sense is not impossible. Poetry is
about human beings, by human beings for human beings, and the
more we know about humankind the better we can read a poem. Try-
ing to found poetry in itself is fruitless because language cannot be
isolated from the people who use it, or from the reality about which
they enter into dialogue. Therefore literary studies must necessarily
be inter-disciplinary and try to reassemble what rationalist dualism
has carved up and packaged in methodologically sealed pieces and
slices. As has been shown, structuralist thinking is inescapably found-
ed in rationalist dualism and therefore cannot deal competently with
the true nature of humanity. A human being is not a mere amalgam
of body and soul. As an individual he or she is capable of innovation
and can make sense of his or her own existence.
Poetry in the broadest sense is the way in which this sense brings
individuals together, so founding a community.
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